“Penal substitution is more than unjust, it is by definition impossible!” This line of thought represents an important objection leveled against penal substitutionary atonement (PSA) by some philosophers of religion. The key to this objection lies in a widely held definition of punishment. According to a number of philosophers of law, like Joel Feinberg andContinue reading “Can Legal Philosophy Help Us Make Sense of Penal Substitution? (TGC Canada)”
Tag Archives: Mark Murphy
Do We Believe in Consequences? Revisiting the “Incoherence Objection” to Penal Substitution
An article I wrote defending a version of penal substitutionary atonement just came out in “Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie.” It’s a constructive model I call the “penal-consequence view.” It’s not necessarily the view I hold to but it’s a view that I think might be helpful to some who want to defendContinue reading “Do We Believe in Consequences? Revisiting the “Incoherence Objection” to Penal Substitution”
Not Penal Substitution But Vicarious Punishment
The following is a summary/notes of Mark Murphy’s article, “Not Penal Substitution but Vicarious Punishment.” (Faith and Philosophy, 26.3, 2009) Summary: PSA fails for conceptual reasons. Punishment is an expressive action so it is not transferable. A relative of PSA, VP, is conceptually coherent. Under VP, the guilty person’s punishment consists in the suffering ofContinue reading “Not Penal Substitution But Vicarious Punishment”
CWoznicki Think Out Loud 