The following is a summary/notes of Mark Murphy’s article, “Not Penal Substitution but Vicarious Punishment.” (Faith and Philosophy, 26.3, 2009)
Summary: PSA fails for conceptual reasons. Punishment is an expressive action so it is not transferable. A relative of PSA, VP, is conceptually coherent. Under VP, the guilty person’s punishment consists in the suffering of an innocent to whom he or she bears a special relationship. Sinful humanity is punished through the death of Jesus.
Human beings on account of their sins deserve to be punished, but that JC was punished in our place so that we no longer bear ill-desert. (253-4)
Ill desert is removed by punishment. Christ is punished for our sins, and thus a necessary condition for unity with God is realized.
There is a conceptual problem w/PSA
Punishment = an authoritative imposition of hard treatment upon one for the failure to adhere to some binding standard.
This definition is not sufficient for punishment. A fourth condition is necessary, namely that punishment expresses condemnation of the wrongdoer.
If this is right then punishment will be non-transferable. Then PSA doesn’t work.
What happens in PSA: A deserves to be punished; but B is punished in A’s place; so A no longer deserves to be punished. A’s ill-desert is removed by B’s personally substituting for A.
What happens in VP: A deserves to be punished; B undergoes hard treatment, which constitutes A’s being punished; and so A no longer deserves to be punished. (260)
Example: A criminal has his spouse killed. This deprives him of a significant good, namely having a wife. The hard treatment condition is met, except it is not in propria persona.
Is VP morally objectionable? After all it has an innocent party suffering.
Reason why it is not morally objectionable: The suffering is willing.
Obj: It is still cruel to do this.
Resp: Yes, cruel, but not unjust.
Obj: There is injustice b/w the wrongdoer and the innocent sufferer.
Resp: This isn’t a criticism of the view itself, rather, the fact that the wrongdoer committed a bad action.
Retribution= depriving the wrongdoer of a significant human good.
This also deters further wrongdoing.
Summary: “We human beings have sinned, having violated the divine law, in egregious ways. We thus merit punishment; and until this ill-desert is requited, there is an obstacle to proper union with God. In order to exact retribution and requite this ill desert, God chose to punish vicariously. Because Christ accepted this scheme freely, and with awareness that he would indeed be called upon to undergo the suffering constitutive of the punishment, it does Jesus neither injustice nor cruelty that he was to suffer in the carrying out the punishment of sinful humanity. So on this view the way that each of us is punished for our transgressions of divine law is that his or her Lord is killed. Each of us, for his or her sins, is subjected to hard treatment of having his or her Lord made to suffer and die. What makes this hard treatment imposed on us sinners is that the relationship of being Lord of is a special relationship that makes the misfortunes of the Lord constitutive of bad for the subject. This is a very hard treatment indeed. (265)
It makes sense of biblical language & addresses other puzzles.
Is punishment compatible with forgiveness? Yes.
One might compensate for one’s failures but still be at odds with the wronged. Forgiveness brings unity.