An article I wrote defending a version of penal substitutionary atonement just came out in “Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie.” It’s a constructive model I call the “penal-consequence view.” It’s not necessarily the view I hold to but it’s a view that I think might be helpful to some who want to defend Penal Substitution. You can check it out here:
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/nzsth.2018.60.issue-2/issue-files/nzsth.2018.60.issue-2.xml
(P.S. I say it’s not my personal view because even though I develop it in this paper I’m currently working on another defense which comes closer to affirming all the things I want to affirm.)
Below is an abstract of the essay:
Summary: Among recent assessments of penal substitutionary accounts of atonement
one significant critique is Mark Murphy’s “incoherence objection.” In this
essay I express general agreement with Murphy’s critique of penal substitution,
yet I suggest that there is a way to reconceive the doctrine of atonement such that
it is conceptually coherent, is commensurate with scripture, and is a version of
penal substitution. I call this view: The Penal-Consequence View of Atonement.
This is a view of atonement that makes use of a distinction between what I call
“penal consequences” and “mere consequences.” The view is defended with
special reference to the topics of corporate moral responsibility and union with
Christ.
Keywords: Atonement, Consequences, Penal Substitution, Punishment, Union
with Christ
CWoznicki Think Out Loud 