Communion and Otherness

In Communion and Otherness, John Zizioulas expands and elaborates upon ideas that were presented in Being and Communion. What sets this book from the earlier book is that instead of focusing on how communion is related to being he focuses on how otherness is related to being – what ties together communion and otherness is that both are relational categories, therefore Zizioulas’ ontology is rightly considered a relational ontology.

Zizioulas begins by decrying how “Individualism is present in the very foundation of this culture.” (1) This, he says is due to the influence of Boethius who taught that a person is an individual of a rational nature and St. Augustine  who emphasized the importance of self-consciousness. Much like Being and Communion, this work seeks to turn back to Patristic sources in order to present (what Zizioulas takes to be) a truly Christian and biblical ontology of persons.

In Being and Communion Zizioulas almost mentions in passing that God the Father is the ground of being of the Trinity. He states, “the fact that God owes his existence to the Father, that is to a person.” (18) Here he does not simply put forth such a claim, he develops an argument for it. By engaging in a close reading of the early creeds and the Cappadocians he argues that “the one ontological arche in the Trinity is the Father, who is in this one sense the One God.” Such a view, he says, remains faithful to the biblical and creedal equation of God with the Father. (119) Part of his argument turns on his interpretation of the Cappadocians use of ousia and hypostasis. “Ousia” connotes “what he is” but “hypostasis” connotes “how he is.” Both terms refer to being. With this version of Trinitarian theology in hand Zizioulas points out several consequences for Theological Anthropology. First, if we are to speak of personhood for humans, we must “allow God’s way of being to reveal to us true personhood.” (141) This means that a person is always a gift from someone, personhood never occurs in an individualistic manner. Second, we must affirm that our personal existence is due to a person and not a nature. This means that the primary ontological category for theological anthropology is persons not natures. Third, we learn that personal otherness is a-symetrical. There is always something which is ontologically prior to ourselves.

Zizioulas’ Trinitarian anthropology has further consequences. Since humans are made in the image of God, we must no longer think of the image of God in terms of our nature, rather we must think of the imago Dei in terms of personhood. He says, “the image of God has precisely to do with this how, not with the what man is.” (165) The only reason we can legitimately speak of human nature being prior to human personhood is because there are other humans who instantiate the nature prior to our personhood coming to exist.

My dissertation on Torrance is a work of Christological anthropology. What I am interested in doing is showing how Torrance’s theological anthropology can be interpreted and be further developed by making use of Christological categories. Chapter six of Communion and Otherness is especially relevant to my dissertation chapter on personhood. There he argues that Christology should not be limited to issues of soteriogology but rather Christology is the key to understanding humanity’s destiny as the image of God. In Christ, human nature “recovers its ekstatic movement towards God.” (238) Through Christ, “personhood is objectively restored not on the level of an individual but on the level of true personhood.” (238) Like Torrance who calls Christ the “personalizing person,” Zizioulas says that “In Christ, therefore, every man acquires his particularity, his hypostasis, his personhood, precisely because” the individual is “constituted as being in and through the same relationship which constitutes Christ’s being.” (240) This relationship which constitutes Christ’s being is the filial relation between Christ and the Father. Through baptism, humans are incorporated into the filial relationship that constitutes Christ’s personhood, thus humans participate in a person constituting relation.

Another interesting point that Zizioulas makes in this chapter that might be relevant to my research is that Christ “constitutes the ontological ground of every man.” (243) Zizioulas calls this the de-individualization of Christ. This “de-individualization” does not make sense with an individualized understanding of personhood—where a person is a wholly independent being—i.e. an understanding of personhood based on substance ontology. Personhood, however, is not introverted, it is ekstatic, thus personhood emerges in relation. Christ is “the man par excellence” because of how he relates to all other human persons, thus in Zizioulas’s words Christ is also the ‘catholic’ man, the “’one’ who is at the same time ‘many.’” (241)

Being and Communion

When Being as Communion came out (especially in English) generated much discussion regarding the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine’s relationship to ecclesiology. Although many Trinitarian theologians would say that the divide between Eastern and Western Trinitarian theologies has been overplayed, Zizioulas emphasis on the uniqueness of Orthodox Trinitarian theology leads to many constructive claims. These constructive claims come primarily in his discussion of ontology and of ecclesiology. Like his ontology, Zizioulas’s ecclesiology begins with particulars; for example the bishop does not exist without the laity and the laity does not exist without a bishop. Moreover, no ordained person realizes his ordination in himself, rather his ordination is realized in the community. In this sense the being of the ordinant is non-existent apart from communion with the community. While Zizioulas’ work on ecclesiology—The eucharist, apostolic succession, ordination, the local church—is fascinating my goal is to draw out what Zizioulas has to say about personhood.

The heart of Zizioulas proposal is his Trinitarian ontology—an ontology he says is formulated by Athanasisus and the Cappadocian Fathers. According to him, they teach that the being of God is a relational being; “without the concept of communion it would not be possible to speak of the being of God.” (17) He explains that it is impossible to speak of the “one God” apart from speaking of the God who is “communion.” Because God is the foundation of being and God is a being in communion, we are led to believe that Trinitarian ontology is the fundamamental ontology for all being. Zizioulas extrapolates from this notion and points out that nothing in existence is conceivable apart from communion.

One thing that makes Zizioulas proposal interesting is his claim that substance is not the cause of communion, rather it is a person that is the cause of communion, specifically it is the Father who is the cause of communion. God the Father is the ground of being of the Trinity. Zizioulas states, “the fact that God owes his existence to the Father, that is to a person, means (a) that his “substance,” his being does not constrain him (God does not exist because He cannot but exist, and (b) that communion is not a constraining structure for his existence.” (18)

These primary ideas mentioned above are developed in the first two chapters of Being and Communion. In these chapters he describes Greek ontology and argues that the Church fathers developed the term hypostasis away from Greek understandings towards a Trinitarian understanding. Western Christians, Zizioulas claims, still operate with Greek ontology, but the Greek fathers teach that the being of God is in the hypostasis, the person of the Father. That the being of God is “caused” by the father allows Christians to affirm the freedom and love of God, something Zizioulas says is impossible if the “cause” of God is a substance and not a person.

As the image of God, humans have a particular telos. This telos is to realize the personal life which is realized in God himself, only at the human level of existence. (50) This, he says, is the meaning of theosis: participation in the personal existence of God. Unless a human participates in the personhood of God that human is not truly personalized. This true personalization, Zizioulas calls “the hypostasis of ecclesial existence.” This mode of being personal is constituted by the new birth, by baptism. (53) The church, and the partaking of the eucharist, leads humans into a personal relationship of communion with Christ—the person through whom we enter into communion with the Triune God.

The aspect of Zizioulas’ proposal that is especially interesting to me is his notion that we are personalized when we enter into communion with Christ. This reminds me of Torrance’s claim that among human beings, Christ is the “personalizing” person and that we are “personalized” persons. Zizioulas explicitly says that “Thanks to Christ man can henceforth himself ‘subsist,” can affirm his existence as personal not on the basis of the immutable laws of his nature, but on the basis of a relationship with God which is identified with what Christ in freedom and love possesses as Son of God with the Father.”  (56) However, Zizioulas goes on to say that this adoption, which is “the identification of his hypostasis with the hypostasis of the Son of God” is the essence of baptism. (56) I disagree with Zizioulas’ theology of baptism, nevertheless, I find the claim that we are hypostasized upon adoption a fascinating claim that I am inclined to affirm.

 

CFP: GOD, TIME AND CHANGE

GOD, TIME AND CHANGE

Call for Papers

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23rd Conference of the European Society for Philosophy of Religion

God, Time and Change

University of Leeds, UK: 3–5 September 2020

This conference investigates the impact of time and change, as two facets of human experience and cognition, on conceptions of God, the divine and ultimate reality. While being a rich source for metaphysical speculation, questions about time and change also provoke discussion of what it means to be human, thereby having profound ethical and social implications. Reflection on time and change in relation to God, the divine or ultimate reality forms the philosophical core of many religious traditions, both theistic and non-theistic. The question, for instance, of whether or not temporality and change should be conceived as inherent attributes of God has been a focus of debate within philosophy of religion since antiquity. Time and change continue to be topics of ongoing research within many academic disciplines. The conference brings current philosophical and scientific theories of time and change into conversation with perspectives from the philosophy of religion.

Call for short papers

Short papers (with a reading time of 20 minutes) are invited in either English or German on the above topics. The questions are suggestive rather than restrictive. Please send abstracts (with a maximum of 15 lines) to espr@godtimeandchange.com by 15th April 2020. You will be notified of the outcome by the end of April. If you need an earlier decision in order to apply for funding, please state this when you submit your abstract and submit the abstract as early as possible. Inquiries can be directed to espr@godtimeandchange.com

Keynote Speakers:

Prof. Robin Le Poidevin, Professor of Metaphysics, University of Leeds, UK

Prof. Lubos Rojka, Professor of Systematic Theology and Philosophy of Religion, Gregorian University, Rome

Prof. Dr. Heiko Schulz, Professor for Systematic Theology and Philosophy of Religion, Faculty for Protestant Theology, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany

Prof. Marcel Sarot, Professor of Fundamental Theology, Tilburg University, Utrecht Netherlands

Prof. Marius Timman Mjaaland, Professor of Religion, University of Oslo, Sweden

Dr Jessica Frazier, Hindu Studies and Philosophy of Religion, Trinity College, University of Oxford and Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, Oxford, UK

Prof. Jayne Svenungsson, Professor of Systematic Theology, University of Lund, Sweden

Prof. Carla Canullo, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, University of Macerata, Italy

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About the ESPR: The European Society for Philosophy of Religion provides a forum for researchers employing different approaches to the philosophy of religion. See http://www.philosophy-of-religion.org

The conference website: http://godtimeandchange.com

AAR Mid-Atlantic Registration – 2020

Greetings from the Mid-Atlantic Region AAR & SBL! We are looking forward to another excellent regional conference set to take place on March 9–10, 2020, at Princeton Theological Seminary in Princeton, NJ. This year’s conference theme is God, Flourishing, and Brokenness. We hope you will consider joining us by visiting our registration page.

This year our region is offering a Graduate Student Registration Fee Waiver for the first three grad students to register for the regional conference! If you are one of the first three students to register, you will be reimbursed for the cost of your registration. Visit the registration page for details.

Regional Conference Graduate Student Programming and Events:

  • Interview Strategies for Academic and Non-Academic Positions
  • How to Use Zotero to Manage Bibliographic Data and Related Research Materials
  • Graduate Student Connection Breakfast

Your Worship Autobiography

Recently, I have been thinking a bit about how our self understanding of our worship experiences over the course of our life shape our current experience with worship. Have you ever wondered about that?

When did worship “begin” for you? What traditions, communities and/or individuals nourished (or harmed) your experience of worship? What practices have been especially valuable to you? Have there been distinct seasons or “ups and downs” in your worship history. Where do you see yourself today? These are all important questions to reflect upon.

 

The story of my worship life revolves around times of solitude and congregational musical worship. I grew up in a Latino Foursquare church. It was in this church that I learned the significance of musical worship. More than half of the service was dedicated to worshipping God through music. In fact, music was so important in this church that all the youth were encouraged to learn an instrument. One night, while playing the drums in a Saturday night service, I told God that he could have complete control over my entire life. The background for this event was that my uncle had just died, my father had just gone to jail, and my mother and I were evicted from our house. Congregational times of musical worship have always been important for me. In fact, I am at the church I currently attend in part because of musical worship. Back in 2006 I was invited to the high school group at a local non-denominational church. They were having a “worship” night and I vividly remember having a quasi-mystical experience during the service. I knew it was the right place for me.

Besides the significance of congregational musical worship, times of solitude have been very important for me as well. From the early years of college up until now I have made it a regular practice to spend time alone with God in nature. Sometimes I would do this by hiking and other times I would visit local spiritual retreat centers. My solitude with God reached a high point in my first year of college. I would regularly skip class to go pray. I would go out into the mountains or I would close the door of my room and pray alone for hours on end. I still vividly remember some of those afternoon in the fall when I was praying. Interestingly, it was after this year long period of intense solitude with God that I ended up straying from the Lord for about a year. I am not sure how those two things are connected, but I am sure that in some way they go hand in hand.

grayscale photo of people raising their hands
Photo by Shelagh Murphy on Pexels.com

As I reflect upon the worship tendencies in my life (i.e. an emphasis on congregational musical worship and solitude) as well as the kind of experiences I have had in the various contexts of worship I notice that they fit quite well with my personality and temperament. By nature I am rather introverted, so, I am very comfortable with times of solitude with God. I am also a very analytical and contemplative type person, so times of self-examination come quite easily. What is more surprising to me is how significant times of congregational worship have been to me. Perhaps these times should not be as surprising because in some church settings congregational worship amounts to “worshipping God by yourself in a room where other people are worshipping God by themselves.” Even in congregational settings, I tend to shut out the rest of the world and just focus in on God. Although I know that everyone’s life story will lead them to resonate with different kinds of worship acts, I have tried to lead the ministries I have served with towards a more contemplative vision of worship. Perhaps this means that I am imposing my own preferences upon others or, hopefully, it means that they get to experience something which is quite rare in our fast-paced culture. I hope to explore and even strengthen the contemplative side of worship in my own life—and in the life of those I serve—while balancing this individualistic aspect of worship with more communal and congregational aspects of worship.

Persons – What Philosophers Say About You

Warren Bourgeois attempts to tackle a set of perennial questions in Persons: What Philosophers Say About You. These questions include, “What are persons?” “What makes this person now identical to that person in the past?” and “What marks the beginning and end of a person.” Bouorgeois’s questions are, in part, motivated by events that are part of his personal life. Bourgeois’’ wife battled multiple sclerosis. He witnessed her descent from being a brilliant philosopher at the University of British Columbia to being someone who suffered from dementia. Eventually, prior to her death, his wife, Daphne lost all capabilities for communication. Bourgeois uses his wife’s tragic case in order to reflect upon how numerous philosophers, and a few theologians, thought about issues related to personhood. Each chapter of this book includes a brief overview of some philosopher’s understanding of the questions surrounding personhood, this is followed by a section where he explains what the philosopher might say about Daphne’s status as a person, and he concludes with some appreciative and critical comments about that particular theory of personhood.

Over the course of this book Bourgeois covers the philosophy of personhood in the works of manifold and varied philosophers. These include: The Presocratics, Plato, Socrates, Augustine, Aquinas, Erasmus, Luther, Montaigne, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz, Butler, Reid, Hume, Rousseau, Hegel, Russell, Ayer, Sartre, Whitehead, Wiggins, Williams, Nozick, Parfit, Nagel, and many more. Almost 350 pages of this 475 page book (not including notes) are dedicated to providing overviews of significant theories of personhood. For this reason, such a book might serve as a helpful textbook. It orients those who have not yet been inducted into debates about personhood into the vast and confusing field. The final 125 pages of the book constitute Bourgeois’s own answers to the questions of personhood.

Prior to noting what his answers are to these questions it should be mentioned that the first section of the book is not just a survey, although it serves as a survey for his readers, I am under the impression that the survey is a significant part of his methodology for constructing a theory of personhood. Throughout the book Bourgeois highlights aspects of other theories that he appreciates. It is only in the constructive section that we see how he draws together these elements that he appreciated into his own theory. It is almost as if Bourgeois is a magpie, picking and choosing shiny objects to adorn its nest, except that rather than shiny objects, Bourgeois is selecting interesting philosophical concepts.

So where does Bourgeois land on his understanding of personhood? From concepts throughout the history of Western thought on personhood Bourgeois homes in on a number of important concepts. Persons are complex individuals, they are irreducible, they possess a “viewline”—by which he means a series of viewpoints—as well as continuity. Furthermore, persons are indivisible, indefinite, embodied, and free. With these features drawn from Western philosophy (ancient to contemporary) he defines his view. A person is a kind of thing with certain abilities that possesses a “viewline.” His inclusion of “certain abilities” provides a notion of a general essence. This general essence, which is described in terms of abilities, includes things like rationality, the ability to love, an aesthetic sense, the and most importantly the ability to self-create. These abilities are both private and public, and to a certain extent are culturally determined. The second feature of his definition of personhood involves the notion of a “viewline.” This viewline is “the locus of my viewpoint through space as it appears to me over time, that is, my series of viewpoints through my life.” (367) The concept of a viewline does a lot of work for Bourgeois. First, it provides Bourgeois with a way to say that no two persons can possess the same viewline. Even is a person, Bob, is perfectly duplicated, Bob’s duplicate will never have the same viewline as Bob himself. Furthermore, much like Locke’s appeal to consciousness as the grounds of the continuity of personal identity over time, Bourgeois appeals to the viewline as being the thing by which we can determine whether a person is identical with a person at two different points in time. Moreover, the concept of the viewline helps Bourgeois articulate a way for determining whether someone is a person or not. If someone does not have a viewline, or does not have a viewline enough of the time then we can justifiably say that that human is not a person. To summarize Bourgeois’ view I quote him at length,

Roughly one is what one can do. An individual essence might be fleshed out in terms of a particular set of capacities peculiar to an individual, over and above those essential for that individual to say in the class of persons. Also in the essence, is the view line, the series of subjective viewpoints of that individual. (397)

At first glance, Bourgeois proposal might seem attractive. Like Aristotle, persons have a form which is determined by abilities, like a host of contemporary philosophers, he emphasizes that conscious subjective experiences play a major role in who we are as persons, and like many theologians he emphasizes the importance of embodiedness for our understanding of personhood (although for much different reasons). The weaknesses of his position, however become apparent when he applies his theory of personhood to medical ethics. He suggests that his definition of personhood means that human beings who are at certain stages of dementia, human beings who have not yet been born, and recently born infants are not persons. Since they are not persons they do not deserve the same level of protection as those who are persons. He does concede that there may be cases where some humans that we do not think are persons are in fact persons, just that we might not know it because we do not have access to their subjective experiences. In these cases, since we do not have epistemic access to what constitutes their personhood we are justified in not expending resources to protect them. While there are arguments in the latter section of the book that deserve detailed responses, the main thing that we should point out is that his definition of personhood –since it includes the ability to perform certain actions—excludes many human beings from personhood, or at the very least relegates them to being borderline cases of persons.

The Call to Personhood

In The Call to Personhood Alistair McFadyen expresses concern about two unsatisfactory conceptions of individuality and personality, these two conceptions are Individualism and Collectivism. Individualism attempts to maintain personal freedom and autonomy and Collectivism tries to take social relations and institutions seriously. However, when each of these two conceptions of personality get pressed too far in either direction there are damaging effects. Thus, McFadyen attempts to chart a via media between these to options. He attempts to construct a third conceptuality which “can do justice to personal freedom and autonomy whilst simultaneously acknowledging the role of social relations and institutions.” (5)

In his attempt to construct a third way McFadyen ends up drawing from a number of theologians and philosophers including Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Jürgen Habermas, Miklas Luhmnann, and Karl-Otto Apel. Most significantly, however, McFadyen’s conception of personhood is shaped by Martin Buber’s philosophy which conceived of personhood in terms of dialogue, i.e the “I and Thou” relation. As such, McFadyen claims that “Individuality, personhood and selfhood do not…refer to some internal independent source of identity, but to the way one is and has been in relation.” (18) This claim is grounded in his understanding of Christian theology. When God created human beings, God created them in his own image. For McFadyen this means that God created them in such a way that they are dialogue partners in God’s address to them. A human being, theologically conceived, is the kind of being characterized by being in a personal relation of “call and response” or “gift and return” of dialogue with God. (19) A human images God’s word by responding to it. (21) Using Buber’s language, McFadyen says that “We are addressed as the Thou corresponding to God’s I. We are called thereby to become, in our turn, is Is in response, to enter personal relationship – a relationship in which our distinct identities are a requirement: Dialogue.”  (22) The “vertical” I-Thou relation with God is reflected in our horizonatal I-Thou relations with other created beings.

The notion that personhood is an I-Thou existence is built upon McFadyen’s Trinitarian theology. The Father, Son, and Spirit are “Persons in relation and Persons only through relation.” (27) God’s ontology is foundational for all ontology, “Persons are what they are only through their relations with others.” (27)

Much of the rest of the book is devoted to unpacking the implications of this conception of personhood. For example, McFadyen develops a theory of the persistence of personal identity and of the self in light of this relational ontology. If Being a person means existing in relation, then for example, personal identity cannot be asocial. A person’s identity is the sedimentation of “moments of moral responsibility within concrete relations.” (73) Embodiment plays a significant role in the formation of identity, since each individual – while being related – is distinctly located in a particular space and time. Thus in some sense identity is a “location” which is related to other “locations.” McFadyen explains, “The body is not, then, a closed boundary between exclusively private and public life, but a field of communication, a point of punctuation.” (89) One implication of his view of identity is that there is no need for some substance which identity attaches itself to. Identity, and the self, simply is how this particular body relates to other bodies. When a person distinguishes between the unique space-time location of the “I” and sees how it is differentiated from other space-time locations, a theory of self emerges, and thus a personal identity emerges. When significant reflection about how the “I” exists in relation to other “thous” or “its” a more robust sense of self develops. The self’s reflections of the I, however, are not transparent or accessible to others (directly), so in one sense the self is closed to the world. Yet at the same time, the self is determined by the network of relations that it exists within, thus the self is ex-centric. What this means is that persons “are punctuated open systems.” (106) The rest of the book is dedicated to developing what this conception of personhood and the self would mean for the Christian understanding of the gospel and for social institutions, including the church, personal relations, and political relations. In this way, McFadyen accomplishes his goal of developing a concept of persons and the self which is neither individualistic (in an atomistic sense) nor collectivist (in the sense that personal identity is diminished).

I and Thou

Martin Buber’s I and Thou begins with the claim that “to man the world is twofold.” Human beings exist and interact with the world in two different ways. These ways are the “I-Thou” relation and the “I-It” relation. The first kind of relation, he says can only be spoken with the whole being, the second is never spoken with the whole being.

This book has been criticized for not being rigorous enough or well argued enough. At times I felt the force of these objections, the book has an almost mystical or even apophatic feel to it. Perhaps this is because of the nature of the subject matter. If Buber is right, that there is a difference between relating to things in an “I-Thou” manner and an “I-It” manner, then perhaps the reason that it is difficult to analytically nail down what Buber is saying is due to the fact that the “I-Thou” relation cannot be analyzed in the same way the “I-It” relation is analyzed. By definition, analyzing an “I-Thou” relation would end up turning that relation into an “I-It” relation. The moment one enagaes in analysis, one converts the object of inquiry into a mere object rather than a “thou” which one dialogues with.

This problem, i.e. turning the subject of inquiry into an “it,” reminded me of the ontotheological problem brought up by a number of theologians. While I think that some theologians and philosophers, like Marilyn McCord Adams and Sarah Coakley, have shown that there isn’t an ontotheological fallacy, I believe that Buber draws our attention to a genuine problem: it is too easy to treat God as an “it” rather than a “thou.”

Theologically, one interesting feature of I and Thou is that Buber posits the existence of an “eternal Thou.” It is difficult to know what to make of this eternal Thou (which Buber says “men have called God.”) The Eternal Thou is the Thou which all Thous seem to participate in. Moreover this eternal Thou is wholly other (or else it would be an I and not a Thou) and at the same time it is wholly present. Genuine prayer is an engagement with the Eternal Thou in dialogical form. Yet, when prayer attempts to get something from God, prayer becomes “magic” and begins to treat God as an it instead of a thou.

While Buber’s work has interesting implications for the doctrine of God, especially Trinitarian theology, my interest in I and Thou is mainly in it’s implications for theological anthropology. This philosophical anthropology—Buber positions this as a work of philosophy and not necessarily theology—builds on the notion that humans exist in three relations. The first relation is our life with nature, our second is our life with others, and our final is with “intelligible forms.” Each of these relations, are in some way, “compassed in the eternal Thou” yet, the Eternal Thou “is not compassed in them.” (101)

Furthermore, Buber indicates that personhood is a relational concept. He says, “The I of the primary word I-It makes its appearance as individuality and becomes conscious of itself as subject. The I of the primary workd I-Thou makes its appearance as person and becomes conscious of itself as subjectivity. Individuality makes its appearance by being differentiated from other individualities. A person makes his appearance by entering into relation with other persons.” (62) This idea seems to be quite foundational for a lot of contemporary theological anthropology. Personhood, many claim, is a relational notion. Persons are constituted by personal relations. Buber’s argument seems to be that a self only emerges as it distinguishes itself from other “thous.” Without a “thou” there is no personal I.

7 Theories of Human Nature

 Seven Theories of Human Nature is a general introduction to philosophical anthropology. Written by Leslie Stevenson, who was a Reader in Logic and Metaphysics at the University of St. Andrews, this book focuses not only on major theories of what it is to be a human being but it also makes suggestions for how to evaluate competing theories.

In discussing how to evaluate competing theories Stevenson notes that a theory of human nature can be maintained in the face of intellectual difficulties in two ways: “(1)not allowing any conceivable evidence to count against the theory, and (2) disposing of criticism by analyzing the motivations of the critic in terms of the theory itself.” (15) If the theory is defended in this way then the theory is a “closed system.” If a theory of human nature necessarily leads to a “closed system,” and it explains away all evidence against the theory, then, we must wonder whether such a system is genuinely justifiable. Stevenson prefers a scientific approach to the examination of these theories. These theories, he says are hypotheses, which can never be known for certain, but can be put to the test by observation and experiment. If these theories make correct predictions then the theory can be justifiably held, if however, the theories’ predictions get falsified then they cannot be rationally held. With this approach to evaluating theories in hand, Stevenson proceeds to examine seven different theories of human nature, those of Plato, Christianity, Marx, Freud, Sartre, Skinner, and Lorenz.

The majority of the chapters follow a similar pattern: there is a presentation of the context of the view, a “diagnosis,” followed by a “prescription,” and then a critical discussion of the view. When he treats Plato for example, he says that the diagnosis that Platonism offers is that most individuals do not manifest the harmony of the three parts of the soul. This defect leads to defective human societies. The prescription for this problem is to help people is to have philosopher kings who can help mold society towards justice (of the society and also of the soul). He then levels standard critiques against Platonism, like the mysterious nature of the Forms, its overly rationalistic understanding of action, and the danger of having philosopher-kings.

There are certainly some theories within this book that are treated more charitably than others. Christianity and Marxism are analyzed in a critical but appreciative manner. Freudian Pyschoanalysis and Skinner’s Behaviorism are heavily critiqued. Yet at the end Stevenson seems to favor the theory of Konrad Lorenz, who was one of the founding fathers of “ethology,” the scientific study of animal behavior. Upon reading this chapter I noted that Lorenz was simply engaged in evolutionary psychology. This was an insightful chapter for me since, I have to admit, I was not familiar with Lorenz prior to reading this book. According to Lorenz, the “diagnosis” is that the human species is threatened with extinction. The prescription is innate aggression. This aggression keeps us alive, yet at the same time if pushed to far it might cause destruction not only of individuals but of the entire species.

What ties all these theories together is that they all offer some account of innate tendencies which are a problem, as well as a proposed solution. Other themes that emerge in the book are the relationship between the material and non-material parts of humans, freedom vs. determinism, rationality vs. desire. Overall this book provides a helpful overview of major theories of human natur

CFP: Barth’s theological exegesis 38th International Barth Conference in The Netherlands

Since the 1980’s, there has been a rich tradition of annual international Karl-Barth-Tagungen (Karl Barth Conferences) in the Netherlands. At these conferences, people interested in Karl Barth’s theology from all over the world, but mainly from The Netherlands and Germany, have met and discussed dialectical theology: renowned scholars, students, and pastors alike.

Until recently, the main language at those conferences was German, although incidentally some English lectures were given. Starting from 2020, English will be the main language, although lectures, papers and reading groups incidentally will be given in German. After all, Karl Barth’s German is of a particular beauty, and regrettably much is lost in translations in any language.

After the retirement of the professors Van der Kooi, Reeling Brouwer and Den Hertog, a new committee, still with members from the Protestant Theological University, the Free University, and Theological University Apeldoorn, will continue these International Barth Conferences in The Netherlands. The 2020 Conference will, as before, take place in De Glind, near Amersfoort.

A new feature is our call for papers: Anyone interested in contributing a paper connected with our theme (even if only loosely) is welcome to send a proposal (see below).

Prof. dr. E. van ‘t Slot (PThU), Dr. K. Tolstaya (VU Amsterdam), Prof. dr. A. Huijgen and dr. C.C. den Hertog (TU Apeldoorn)

About the conference theme

What exactly is the systematic or dogmatic theologian doing when she translates biblical and exegetical matter into systematic discourse? Karl Barth is famous for the long biblical excurses in his Church Dogmatics. Besides, he has written at least six commentaries on Pauline texts (from the first edition of his Letter to the Romans until his brochure on Christ and Adam according to Romans 5); and he has extendedly lectured on John, James, and Ephesians. He has often stated that the exegetical parties in his books were even dearer to him than the dogmatic ‘bigger font’ sections. However, how do we evaluate this issue a hundred years after the First Commentary on Romans and fifty years after Barth’s passing away? Barth has exercised great influence on exegetes of all kinds of schools – but is his voice still relevant in biblical studies? And, the other way around, how can systematic theologians (more or less) operating in Barth’s tradition, remain attentive to new exegetical insights? And how about the place of the Old Testament in questions like these?

Call for papers

At the conference there will be timeslots in which short papers (max. 2500 words) on these issues can be presented and discussed. Proposals (max. 250 words) may be sent to dr. E. van ‘t Slot, e.vant.slot@pthu.nl before November 1st, 2019. Papers on topics of Barth and theological exegesis will be given priority.

Practical information

Date: 9-11th March 2020
Location: De Glind (The Netherlands)
Pricing: € 260  (Students fee: € 180)
Registration includes: full program access, lodging and meals, coffee and tea during the day. Refreshments and drinks at the bar in the bar are for your own expense.

Please register here.

See original post here: https://www.pthu.nl/en/News_and_Events/News/bart-tagung-2020-call-for-pape/

Please register here.